

BOARD AGENDA ITEM JULY 131
PROPOSED NEW AND AMENDED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA

Rules Authorized for Public Comment Following Consideration of the Rules Revision Commission Final Report

(Authorized for Additional 30-day Public Comment Period by the Board Committee on Regulation and Admissions on July 24, 2010.)*
(Authorized for Additional 30-day Public Comment Period by the Board of Governors on July 25, 2010.)*

Proposed Rule 1.0.11
Proposed Rule 2.15
Proposed Rule 3.36
Proposed Rule 3.810
Proposed Rule 4.213
Proposed Rule 5.417
Proposed Rule 8.420

* This authorization for release for public comment is not, and shall not be construed as, a statement or recommendation of approval of the proposed new or amended Rules of Professional Conduct.

Rule 1.0.1: Terminology
(Commission’s Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

- (a) “Belief” or “believes” means that the person involved actually supposes the fact in question to be true. A person’s belief may be inferred from circumstances.
- (b) [Reserved]
- (c) “Firm” or “law firm” means a law partnership; a professional law corporation; a sole proprietorship or an association engaged in the practice of law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or in the legal department, division or office of a corporation, of a government organization, or of another organization.
- (d) “Fraud” or “fraudulent” means conduct that is fraudulent under the law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive.
- (e) “Informed consent” means a person’s agreement to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated and explained (i) the relevant circumstances and (ii) the actual and reasonably foreseeable material risks of the proposed conduct and, where appropriate, the reasonably available alternatives to the proposed conduct.
- (e-1) “Informed written consent” means that both the communication and consent required by paragraph (e) must be in writing.
- (e-2) “Information protected by Business & Professions Code section 6068(e)” is defined in Rule 1.6, Comments [3] – [6].
- (f) “Knowingly,” “known,” or “knows” means actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.
- (g) “Partner” means a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized as a professional corporation, or a member of an association authorized to practice law.
- (g-1) “Person” means a natural person or an organization.
- (h) “Reasonable” or “reasonably” when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer means the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.
- (i) “Reasonable belief” or “reasonably believes” when used in reference to a lawyer means that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.
- (j) “Reasonably should know” when used in reference to a lawyer means that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.
- (k) “Screened” means the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter, including the timely imposition of procedures within a law firm that are adequate under the circumstances (i) to protect information that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these Rules or other law; and (ii) to protect against other law firm lawyers and non-lawyer personnel communicating with the lawyer with respect to the matter.

- (l) “Substantial” when used in reference to degree or extent means a material matter of clear and weighty importance.
- (m) “Tribunal” means: (i) a court, an arbitrator, or an administrative law judge acting in an adjudicative capacity and authorized to make a decision that can be binding on the parties involved; or (ii) a special master or other person to whom a court refers one or more issues and whose decision or recommendation can be binding on the parties if approved by the court.
- (n) “Writing” or “written” has the meaning stated in Evidence Code section 250. A “signed” writing includes an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed, inserted, or adopted by or at the direction of a person with the intent to sign the writing.

COMMENT

Firm or Law Firm

[1] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a law firm can depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a law firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a law firm or conduct themselves as a law firm, they may be regarded as a law firm for purposes of these Rules. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in

doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the rule that is involved.

[2] Whether a lawyer who is denominated as “of counsel” should be deemed a member of a law firm will also depend on the specific facts. The term “of counsel” implies that the lawyer so designated has a relationship with the law firm, other than as a partner or associate, or officer or shareholder, that is close, personal, continuous, and regular. Thus, to the extent the relationship between a law firm and a lawyer is sufficiently “close, personal, regular and continuous,” such that the lawyer is held out to the public as “of counsel” for the law firm, the relationship of the law firm and “of counsel” lawyer will be considered a single firm for purposes of disqualification. See, e.g., *People ex rel. Department of Corporations v. Speedee Oil Change Systems, Inc.* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 816]. On the other hand, even when a lawyer has associated as “of counsel” with another lawyer and is providing extensive legal services on a matter, they will not necessarily be considered the same law firm for purposes of dividing fees under Rule 1.5.1 where, for example, they both continue to maintain independent law practices with separate identities, separate addresses of record with the State Bar, and separate clients, expenses, and liabilities. See, e.g., *Chambers v. Kay* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 142 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 536]. Whether a lawyer should be deemed a member of a law firm when denominated as “special counsel”, or by another term having no commonly understood definition, also will depend on the specific facts.

[3] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or different components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these Rules.

- [4] This Rule does not authorize any person or entity to engage in the practice of law in this state except as otherwise permitted by law.

Fraud

- [5] When used in these Rules, the terms “fraud” or “fraudulent” refer to conduct that is characterized as such under the law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these Rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform.

Informed Consent and Informed Written Consent

- [6] Many of the rules require a lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. Other rules require a lawyer to obtain informed written consent. Compare, for example, Rules 1.2(c) and 1.6(a) (informed consent) with Rules 1.7, 1.8.1 and 1.9 (informed written consent). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. In any event, this will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct, and a discussion of the client’s or other person’s

reasonably available options and alternatives. In determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently represented by other counsel in giving the consent.

- [7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client’s or other person’s silence. However, except where the standard is one of informed *written* consent, consent may be inferred from the conduct of a client or other person who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. See paragraph (n) for the definition of “writing” and “written”.

Screened

- [8] This definition applies to situations where screening of a personally prohibited lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under Rules 1.11 or 1.12.
- [9] The purpose of screening is to assure the affected client, former client, or prospective client that confidential information known by the personally prohibited lawyer is neither disclosed to other law firm lawyers or non-lawyer personnel nor used to the detriment of the person to whom the duty of confidentiality is owed. The personally prohibited lawyer shall acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers and non-lawyer personnel in the law firm with respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers and non-lawyer personnel in the law firm who are working on the matter promptly shall be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not

communicate with the personally prohibited lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. To implement, reinforce and remind all affected law firm personnel of the presence of the screening, it may be appropriate for the law firm to undertake such procedures as a written undertaking by the personally prohibited lawyer to avoid any communication with other law firm personnel and any contact with any law firm files or other materials relating to the matter, written notice and instructions to all other law firm personnel forbidding any communication with the personally prohibited lawyer relating to the matter, denial of access by that lawyer to law firm files or other materials relating to the matter, and periodic reminders of the screen to the personally prohibited lawyer and all other law firm personnel.

[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for screening.

Tribunal

[11] This definition is limited to courts and their equivalent in order to distinguish the special and heightened duties that lawyers owe to courts from the important but more limited duties of honesty and integrity that a lawyer owes when acting as an advocate before a legislative body or administrative agency. Compare Rule 3.3 to Rule 3.9.

Writing and Written

[12] These Rules utilize California's statutory definition to avoid confusion by California lawyers familiar with it. It is substantially the same as the definitions in the ABA Model Rules and most other jurisdictions.

Rule 2.1 Advisor

(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

Rule 2.1 Advisor

In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.

Comment

[1] Independent professional judgment is an essential element of a lawyer's relationship with a client. Independent professional judgment is judgment that is not influenced by duties, relationships or interests that are not properly part of the lawyer-client relationship.

[2] A client is entitled to straightforward advice expressing the lawyer's honest assessment. Legal advice may involve facts and alternatives that a client may find unpleasant and may be disinclined to confront. In presenting advice, a lawyer endeavors to sustain the client's morale and may put advice in as acceptable a form as honesty permits. However, a lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client.

[3] In some cases, advice couched in narrow legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially where practical considerations, such as cost or effects on other people, are predominant. Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor, in rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law, but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors that may be relevant to the client's situation.

Rule 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal
(Commission’s Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

- (a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
 - (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;
 - (2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or
 - (3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence, and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6 and Business and Professions Code section 6068(e). A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.
- (b) A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures to the extent permitted by Rule 1.6 and Business and Professions Code section 6068(e).
- (c) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding or the representation, whichever comes first.
- (d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.

Comment

- [1] This Rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a client in the proceedings of a tribunal. See Rule 1.0.1(m) for the definition of “tribunal.” It also applies when the lawyer is representing a client in an ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant to the tribunal’s adjudicative authority, such as a deposition. Thus, for example, paragraph (a)(3) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures if the lawyer comes to know that a client who is testifying in a deposition has offered evidence that is false.
- [2] This Rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process. A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation to present the client’s case with persuasive force. However, although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is not required to present an impartial exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause, the lawyer must not make false statements of law or fact or present evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. For example, the prohibition in paragraph (a)(1) against making false statements of law or failing to correct a material misstatement of law includes a prohibition on a lawyer citing as authority a decision that has been overruled or a statute that has been repealed or declared unconstitutional, or failing to correct such a citation previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer.

Representations by a Lawyer

- [3] A lawyer is responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared for litigation but is usually not required to have personal knowledge of the facts asserted therein because litigation documents ordinarily present assertions of fact by the client, or a witness, and not by the lawyer. Compare Rule 3.1. However, an assertion of fact purporting to be based on the lawyer's own knowledge, as in a declaration or an affidavit by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry. *Bryan v. Bank of America* (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 185 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 148]. There are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation. *Di Sabatino v. State Bar* (1980) 27 Cal.3d 159 [162 Cal.Rptr. 458]. The obligation prescribed in Rule 1.2(d) not to counsel a client to commit or assist the client in committing a fraud applies in litigation. Regarding compliance with Rule 1.2(d), see the comment to that Rule. See also the comment to Rule 8.4(b).

Legal Argument

- [4] Although a lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, legal argument based on a knowing false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal. A tribunal that is fully informed on the applicable law is better able to make a fair and accurate determination of the matter before it. Paragraph (a)(2) requires a lawyer to disclose directly adverse and legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction that is known to the lawyer and that has not been disclosed by the opposing party. Legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction may include legal authority outside the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, such as a federal statute or case that is determinative of an issue in a state court proceeding or a Supreme Court decision that is binding on a

lower court. Under this Rule, the lawyer must disclose authorities the court needs to be aware of in order to rule intelligently on the matter. Paragraph (a)(2) does not impose on lawyers a general duty to cite authority from outside the jurisdiction in which the tribunal is located. Whether a criminal defense lawyer is required to disclose directly adverse legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction involves constitutional principles that are beyond the scope of these Rules. In addition, a lawyer may not knowingly edit and submit to a tribunal language from a book, statute, rule, or decision in such a way as to mislead the court, or knowingly fail to correct an inadvertent material misquotation that the lawyer previously made to the tribunal.

Offering Evidence

- [5] Paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, regardless of the client's wishes. A lawyer does not violate this Rule if the lawyer offers the evidence for the purpose of establishing its falsity.
- [6] If a lawyer knows that the client intends to testify falsely or wants the lawyer to introduce false evidence, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered. If the persuasion is ineffective and the lawyer continues to represent the client, the lawyer must refuse to offer the false evidence. With respect to criminal defendants, see Comment [7]. If only a portion of a witness's testimony will be false, the lawyer may call the witness to testify but may not elicit the testimony that the lawyer knows is false or base arguments to the trier of fact on evidence known to be false.
- [7] The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) apply to all lawyers, including defense counsel in criminal cases. If a criminal defendant insists on testifying, and the lawyer knows that the testimony will be false, the lawyer may offer the testimony in a narrative form if the lawyer made

reasonable efforts to dissuade the client from the unlawful course of conduct and the lawyer has sought permission from the court to withdraw as required by Rule 1.16. Business and Professions Code section 6068(d); *People v. Guzman* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915 [248 Cal.Rptr. 467], disapproved on other grounds in *Price v. Superior Court* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069 fn.13 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 409]; *People v. Johnson* (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 608 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 805]; *People v. Jennings* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 899 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 33]; *People v. Brown* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1335, 1340 [250 Cal.Rptr. 762]. The obligations of a lawyer under these Rules and the State Bar Act are subordinate to applicable constitutional provisions.

- [8] The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false. A lawyer's reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact. See, e.g., *People v. Bolton* (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 343, [82 Cal.Rptr.3d 671]. A lawyer's knowledge that evidence is false, however, can be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 1.0.1(f). Thus, although a lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious falsehood.

Remedial Measures

- [9] Having offered material evidence in the belief that it was true, a lawyer may subsequently come to know that the evidence is false. Or, a lawyer may be surprised when the lawyer's client, or another witness called by the lawyer, offers testimony the lawyer knows to be false, either during the lawyer's direct examination or in response to cross-examination by the opposing lawyer. In such situations or if the lawyer knows of the falsity of testimony elicited from the client during a deposition, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures. The lawyer's proper course is to remonstrate with the client confidentially, advise the client

of the consequences of providing perjured testimony and of the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal, and seek the client's cooperation with respect to the withdrawal or correction of the false statements or evidence. If that fails, the lawyer must take further remedial measures, see Comment [10], and may be required to seek permission to withdraw under Rule 1.16(b), depending on the materiality of the false evidence.

- [10] Reasonable remedial measures under paragraphs (a)(3) and (b) refer to measures that are available under these Rules and the State Bar Act, and which a reasonable lawyer would consider appropriate under the circumstances to comply with the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal. See e.g., Rules 1.2(d), 1.4, 1.16 and 8.4; Business and Professions Code sections 6068(d) and 6128. Remedial measures also include explaining to the client the lawyer's obligations under this Rule and, where applicable, the reasons for lawyer's decision to seek permission from the tribunal to withdraw, and remonstrating further with the client to take corrective action that would eliminate the need for the lawyer to withdraw. If the client is an organization, the lawyer should also consider the provisions of Rule 1.13. Remedial measures do not include disclosure of client confidential information, which the lawyer is required to maintain inviolate under Rule 1.6 and Business and Professions Code section 6068(e).
- [11] A lawyer's duty to take reasonable remedial measures under paragraph (a)(3) is limited to the proceeding in which the lawyer has offered the evidence in question. A lawyer's duty to take remedial measures under paragraph (b) does not apply to another lawyer who is retained to represent a person in an investigation or proceeding concerning that person's conduct in the prior proceeding.

Preserving Integrity of Adjudicative Process

[12] Lawyers have a special obligation to protect a tribunal against criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process, such as bribing, intimidating or otherwise unlawfully communicating with a witness, juror, court official or other participant in the proceeding, unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or other evidence relating to the proceeding or failing to disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do so. See Rule 3.4. Thus, paragraph (b) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures whenever the lawyer knows that a person, including the lawyer's client, intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding.

Duration of Obligation

[13] Paragraph (c) establishes a practical time limit on the obligation to rectify false evidence or false statements of law and fact. Either the conclusion of the proceeding or of the representation provides a reasonably definite point for the termination of the mandatory obligations under this Rule. A proceeding has concluded within the meaning of this Rule when a final judgment in the proceeding has been affirmed on appeal or the time for review has passed. There may be obligations that go beyond this Rule. See, e.g., Rule 3.8.

Withdrawal

[14] A lawyer's compliance with the duty of candor imposed by this Rule does not require that the lawyer withdraw from the representation of a client whose interests will be or have been adversely affected by the lawyer's taking reasonable remedial measures. The lawyer may, however, be required by Rule 1.16(a) to seek permission of the tribunal to withdraw if the lawyer's compliance with this Rule's duty of candor results in a deterioration of the lawyer-client relationship such that the lawyer can no longer competently and diligently represent the client, or where

continued employment will result in a violation of these Rules. Also see Rule 1.16(b) for the circumstances in which a lawyer will be permitted to seek a tribunal's permission to withdraw. This Rule does not modify the lawyer's obligations under Rule 1.6 and Business and Professions Code section 6068(e) or the California Rules of Court with respect to any request to withdraw that is premised on a client's misconduct.

Rule 3.8 Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor
(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

A prosecutor in a criminal case shall:

- (a) refrain from commencing or prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause;
- (b) make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;
- (c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing, unless the tribunal has approved the appearance of the accused *in propria persona*;
- (d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal;
- (e) not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury proceeding, criminal proceeding, or civil proceeding related to a criminal matter to present evidence about a past or present client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes:
 - (1) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege or the work product doctrine;
 - (2) the evidence sought is reasonably necessary to the successful completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecution; and
 - (3) there is no other reasonable alternative to obtain the information;
- (f) exercise reasonable care to prevent persons under the supervision or direction of the prosecutor, including investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6.
- (g) When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted, the prosecutor shall:
 - (1) promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or authority, and
 - (2) if the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor's jurisdiction,
 - (i) promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court authorizes delay, and
 - (ii) undertake further investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause an investigation, to determine whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit.
- (h) When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a defendant in the prosecutor's jurisdiction was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction.

Comment

- [1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence, and that special precautions are taken to prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons. Competent representation of the sovereign may require a prosecutor to undertake some procedural and remedial measures as a matter of obligation. Applicable law may require other measures by the prosecutor. Knowing disregard of those obligations, or a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion, could constitute a violation of Rule 8.4.
- [1A] The term “prosecutor” in this Rule includes the office of the prosecutor and all lawyers affiliated with the prosecutor’s office who are responsible for the prosecution function.
- [1B] Paragraph (b) does not change the obligations imposed on prosecutors by applicable law. Paragraph (b) does not apply where there is no right to counsel. “Reasonable efforts” include determining, where appropriate, whether an accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and taking appropriate measures if this has not been done.
- [2] A defendant may waive a preliminary hearing and thereby lose a valuable opportunity to challenge probable cause. Accordingly, prosecutors should not seek to obtain waivers of preliminary hearings or other important pretrial rights from unrepresented accused persons. Paragraph (c), however, does not forbid the lawful questioning of an uncharged suspect who has knowingly waived the right to counsel and the right to remain silent. Paragraph (c) also does not forbid prosecutors from seeking from an unrepresented accused a reasonable waiver of time for initial appearance or preliminary hearing as a means of facilitating the accused’s voluntary cooperation in an ongoing law enforcement investigation.
- [2A] The obligations in paragraph (d) apply only with respect to controlling law existing at the time of the obligation and not with respect to subsequent law that is determined to apply retroactively. The disclosure obligations in paragraph (d) apply even if the defendant is acquitted or is able to avoid prejudice on grounds unrelated to the prosecutor’s failure to disclose the evidence or information to the defense.
- [3] The exception in paragraph (d) recognizes that a prosecutor may seek an appropriate protective order from the tribunal if disclosure of information to the defense could result in substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest.
- [4] Paragraph (e) is intended to limit the issuance of lawyer subpoenas in grand jury and other criminal proceedings to those situations in which there is a genuine need to intrude into the lawyer-client or other privileged relationship.
- [5] Paragraph (f) supplements Rule 3.6, which prohibits extrajudicial statements that have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. This comment is not intended to restrict the statements which a prosecutor may make that comply with Rule 3.6(b) or 3.6(c).
- [6] Prosecutors are subject to Rules 5.1 and 5.3. Ordinarily, the reasonable care standard will be satisfied if the prosecutor issues the appropriate cautions to law-enforcement personnel and other relevant individuals. Ordinarily, the reasonable care standard will be satisfied

if the prosecutor issues the appropriate cautions to law-enforcement personnel and other relevant individuals.

- [6A] Like other lawyers, prosecutors are also subject to Rule 3.3, which requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures to correct material evidence that the lawyer has offered when that lawyer comes to know of its falsity. See Rule 3.3, Comment [12].
- [7] When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a person was convicted of a crime that the person did not commit, and the conviction was obtained outside the prosecutor's jurisdiction, paragraph (g)(1) requires prompt disclosure to the court or other appropriate authority, such as the chief prosecutor of the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred. If the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor's jurisdiction, paragraph (g)(2) requires the prosecutor to examine the evidence and undertake further investigation to determine whether the defendant is in fact innocent. The scope of an inquiry under paragraph (g)(2) will depend on the circumstances. In some cases, the prosecutor may recognize the need to reinvestigate the underlying case; in others, it may be appropriate to await development of the record in collateral proceedings initiated by the defendant. The nature of a paragraph (g)(2) inquiry or investigation must be such as to provide a "reasonable belief," as defined in Rule 1.0.1(i), that the conviction should or should not be set aside. Alternatively, the prosecutor is required under paragraph (g)(2) to make reasonable efforts to cause another appropriate authority to undertake the necessary investigation, and to promptly disclose the evidence to the court and, absent court-authorized delay, to the defendant. Consistent with the objectives of Rules 4.2 and 4.3, disclosure to a represented defendant must be made through the defendant's counsel, and, in the case of an unrepresented defendant, would ordinarily be accompanied by a request to a court for the appointment of counsel to assist the

defendant in taking such legal measures as may be appropriate. The post-conviction disclosure duty applies to new, credible and material evidence of innocence regardless of whether it could previously have been discovered by the defense.

- [8] Under paragraph (h), once the prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor must seek to remedy the conviction. Necessary steps may include disclosure of the evidence to the defendant, requesting that the court appoint counsel for an unrepresented indigent defendant and, where appropriate, or notifying the court that the prosecutor has knowledge that the defendant did not commit the offense of which the defendant was convicted.
- [9] A prosecutor's independent judgment, made in good faith, that the new evidence is not of such nature as to trigger the obligations of sections (g) and (h), does not constitute a violation of this Rule even if the judgment is subsequently determined to have been erroneous. For purposes of this rule, a judgment is made in good faith if the prosecutor reasonably believes that the new evidence does not create a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted.
- [10] A current or former prosecutor, and any lawyer associated with such person in a law firm, is prohibited from advising, aiding or promoting the defense in any criminal matter or proceeding in which the prosecutor has acted or participated. See Business and Professions Code section 6131. See also Rule 1.7, Comment [16]

Rule 4.2: Communication with a Represented Person
(Commission’s Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

- (a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate directly or indirectly about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer.
- (b) For purposes of this Rule, a “person” includes:
 - (1) A current officer, director, partner, or managing agent of a corporation, partnership, association, or other represented organization; or
 - (2) A current employee, member, agent or other constituent of a represented organization if the subject matter of the communication is any act or omission of the employee, member, agent or other constituent in connection with the matter, which may be binding upon or imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability, or if the statement of such person may constitute an admission on the part of the organization.
- (c) This Rule shall not prohibit:
 - (1) Communications with a public official, board, committee or body; or
 - (2) Communications initiated by a person seeking advice or representation from an independent lawyer of the person’s choice; or
 - (3) Communications authorized by law or a court order.
- (d) When communicating on behalf of a client with any person as permitted by this Rule, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.
- (e) In any communication permitted by this Rule, a lawyer shall not seek to obtain privileged or other confidential information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know the person may not reveal without violating a duty to another or which the lawyer is not otherwise entitled to receive.
- (f) A lawyer for a corporation, partnership, association or other organization shall not represent that he or she represents all employees, members, agents or other constituents of the organization unless such representation is true.
- (g) As used in this Rule, “public official” means a public officer of the United States government, or of a state, or of a county, township, city, political subdivision, or other governmental organization, with the equivalent authority and responsibilities as the non-public organizational constituents described in paragraph (b)(1).

COMMENT

Overview and Purpose

- [1] This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal system by protecting a person who has chosen to be represented by a lawyer in a matter against possible overreaching by other lawyers who are participating in the matter, interference by those lawyers with the client-lawyer relationship, and the uncounseled disclosure of information relating to the representation.
- [2] This Rule applies to communications with any person who is represented by counsel concerning the matter to which the communication relates.
- [3] This Rule applies even though the represented person initiates or consents to the communication. A lawyer must immediately terminate communication with a person if, after commencing communication, the lawyer learns that the person is one with whom communication is not permitted by this Rule.
- [4] As used in paragraph (a), “the subject of the representation,” “matter,” and “person” are not limited to a litigation context. This Rule applies to communications with any person, whether or not a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding, contract or negotiation, who is represented by counsel concerning the matter to which the communication relates.
- [5] The prohibition against “indirect” communication with a person represented by counsel in paragraph (a) is intended to address situations where a lawyer seeks to communicate with a represented person through an intermediary such as an agent or investigator.

- [6] This Rule does not prohibit communications with a represented person, or an employee, member, agent, or other constituent of a represented organization, concerning matters outside the representation. For example, the existence of a controversy, investigation or other matter between the government and a private person, or between two organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from communicating with the other, or with nonlawyer representatives of the other, regarding a separate matter.

Communications Between Represented Persons

- [7] This Rule does not prohibit represented persons from communicating directly with one another, and a lawyer is not prohibited from advising the lawyer’s client that such communication may be made. A lawyer may advise a client about what to say or not to say to a represented person and may draft or edit the client’s communications with a represented person, subject to paragraph (e).
- [8] This Rule does not prevent a lawyer who is a party to a matter from communicating directly or indirectly with a person who is represented in the matter. To avoid possible abuse in such situations, the lawyer for the represented person may advise his or her client (1) about the risks and benefits of communications with a lawyer-party, and (2) not to accept or engage in communications with the lawyer-party.

Knowledge of Representation and Limited Scope Representation

- [9] This Rule applies where the lawyer has actual knowledge that the person to be contacted is represented by another lawyer in the matter. However, knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 1.0.1(f).

- [10] When a lawyer knows that a person is represented by another lawyer on a limited basis, the lawyer may communicate with that person with respect to matters outside the scope of the limited representation. See Comment [6]. In addition, this Rule does not prevent a lawyer from communicating with a person who is represented by another lawyer on a limited basis where the lawyer who seeks to communicate does not know about the other lawyer's limited representation because that representation has not been disclosed. In either event, a lawyer seeking to communicate with such person must comply with paragraphs (d) and (e) or with Rule 4.3.

Represented Organizations and Constituents of Organizations

- [11] "Represented organization" as used in paragraph (b) includes all forms of governmental and private organizations, such as cities, counties, corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies, and unincorporated associations.
- [12] As used in paragraph (b)(1) "managing agent" means an employee, member, agent or other constituent of a represented organization with general powers to exercise discretion and judgment with respect to the matter on behalf of the organization. A constituent's official title or rank within an organization is not necessarily determinative of his or her authority.
- [13] Paragraph (b)(2) applies to current employees, members, agents, and constituents of the organization, who, whether because of their rank or implicit or explicit conferred authority, are authorized to speak on behalf of the organization in connection with the subject matter of the representation, with the result that their statements may constitute an

admission on the part of the organization under the applicable California laws of agency or evidence. See Evidence Code section 1222.

- [14] If an employee, member, agent, or other constituent of an organization is represented in the matter by his or her own counsel, the consent by that counsel is sufficient for purposes of this Rule.
- [15] This Rule generally does not apply to communications with an organization's in-house lawyer who is acting as a legal representative of the organization where the organization is also represented by outside legal counsel in the matter that is the subject of the communication. However, this Rule does apply when the in-house lawyer is a "person" under paragraph (b)(2) with whom communications are prohibited by the Rule.

Represented Governmental Organizations

- [16] Paragraph (c)(1) recognizes that when a lawyer communicates on behalf of a client with a governmental organization special considerations exist as a result of the rights conferred under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 3 of the California Constitution. A "public official" as defined in paragraph (g) means government officials with the equivalent authority and responsibilities as the non-public organizational constituents described in paragraph (b)(1). Therefore, a lawyer seeking to communicate on behalf of a client with a governmental organization constituent who is not a public official must comply with paragraph (b)(2) when the lawyer knows the governmental organization is represented in the matter. In addition, the lawyer must also comply with paragraphs (d) and (e) when the lawyer knows the governmental organization is represented

in the matter that is the subject of the communication, and otherwise must comply with Rule 4.3.

Represented Person Seeking Second Opinion

[17] Paragraph (c)(2) permits a lawyer who is not already representing another person in the matter to communicate with a person seeking to hire new counsel or to obtain a second opinion where the communication is initiated by that person. A lawyer contacted by such a person continues to be bound by other Rules of Professional Conduct. See, e.g., Rules 1.7 and 7.3.

Communications Authorized by Law or Court Order

[18] This Rule controls communications between a lawyer and persons the lawyer knows to be represented by counsel unless a statutory scheme, court rule, case law, or court order overrides the Rule. There are a number of express statutory schemes which authorize communications that would otherwise be subject to this Rule. These statutes protect a variety of other rights such as the right of employees to organize and to engage in collective bargaining, employee health and safety, or equal employment opportunity.

[19] Paragraph (c)(3) recognizes that prosecutors or other lawyers representing governmental entities in civil, criminal, or administrative law enforcement investigations, or in juvenile delinquency proceedings, as authorized by relevant federal and state, constitutional, decisional and statutory law, may engage in legitimate investigative activities, either directly or through investigative agents and informants. Although the “authorized by law” exception in these circumstances may run counter to the broader policy that underlies this Rule,

nevertheless, the exception in this context is in the public interest and is necessary to promote legitimate law enforcement functions that would otherwise be impeded. Communications under paragraph (c)(3) implicate other rights and policy considerations, including a person’s right to counsel under the 5th and 6th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and parallel provisions of the California Constitution (Cal. Const., Art. I, §15), that are beyond the scope of this Comment. In addition, certain investigative activities might be improper on grounds extraneous to this Rule or in circumstances where a government lawyer engages in misconduct or unlawful conduct.

[20] Former Rule 2-100 prohibited communications with a “party” represented by another lawyer, while paragraph (a) of this Rule prohibits communications with a “person” represented by another lawyer. This change is not intended to preclude legitimate communications by or on behalf of prosecutors, or other lawyers representing governmental entities in civil, criminal, or administrative law enforcement investigations, that were recognized by the former Rule as authorized by law, or to expand or limit existing law that permits or prohibits communications under paragraph (c)(3). This change also is not intended to preclude the development of the law with respect to which criminal and civil law enforcement communications are authorized by law. Nor is this change intended to preclude legitimate communications by or on behalf of lawyers representing persons accused of crimes that might be authorized under the Sixth Amendment or other constitutional right.

[21] A lawyer who is uncertain whether a communication with a represented person is permissible might be able to seek a court order. A lawyer also might be able to seek a court order in exceptional circumstances to authorize a communication that would otherwise be

Rule 5.4: Financial and Similar Arrangements With Nonlawyers
(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

- (a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees directly or indirectly with a person who is not a lawyer or with an organization that is not authorized to practice law. This paragraph does not prohibit:
- (1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate to provide for the payment of money or other consideration at once or over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one or more specified persons;
 - (2) any payment authorized by Rule 1.17;
 - (3) a lawyer or law firm including nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement, provided the plan does not otherwise violate these Rules or the State Bar Act; or
 - (4) the payment of a prescribed registration, referral, or other fee by a lawyer to a lawyer referral service established, sponsored and operated in accordance with the State Bar of California's minimum standards for a lawyer referral service in California; or
 - (5) a lawyer's or law firm's payment of court-awarded legal fees to a nonprofit organization that employed, retained or recommended employment of the lawyer or law firm in the matter.
- (b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership or other organization with a person who is not a lawyer if any of the activities of the partnership or other organization consist of the practice of law.
- (c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's provision of legal services, or otherwise to interfere with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, or with the lawyer-client relationship, in rendering such legal services.
- (d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or organization authorized to practice law for a profit if:
- (1) a person who is not a lawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;
 - (2) a person who is not a lawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof or occupies a position of similar responsibility in any form of organization other than a corporation; or
 - (3) a person who is not a lawyer has the right or authority to direct, influence or control the professional judgment of a lawyer.
- (e) A lawyer shall not accept a referral from, or otherwise participate in, a lawyer referral service unless it complies with the Rules and Regulations Pertaining to Lawyer Referral Services as adopted by the Board of Governors of the State Bar.
- (f) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a non-profit legal aid, mutual benefit or advocacy group if the nonprofit organization allows any third person or organization to interfere with the lawyer's

independence of professional judgment, or with the lawyer-client relationship, or allows or aids any person, organization or group that is not a lawyer or not otherwise authorized to practice law, to practice law unlawfully.

COMMENT

- [1] A lawyer is required to maintain independence of professional judgment in rendering legal services. The provisions of this Rule protect the lawyer's independence of professional judgment by restricting the sharing of fees with a person or organization that is not authorized to practice law and by prohibiting a nonlawyer from directing or controlling the lawyer's professional judgment when rendering legal services to another.
- [2] The prohibition against sharing fees "directly or indirectly" in paragraph (a) does not prohibit a lawyer or law firm from paying a bonus to or otherwise compensating a nonlawyer employee from general revenues received for legal services, provided the arrangement does not interfere with the independence of professional judgment of the lawyer or lawyers in the firm and does not violate any other rule of professional conduct. However, a nonlawyer employee's bonus or other form of compensation may not be based on a percentage or share of fees in specific cases or legal matters.
- [3] Paragraph (a) also does not prohibit the payment to a nonlawyer third party for goods and services to a lawyer or law firm even if the compensation for such goods and services is paid from the lawyer's or law firm's general revenues. However, the compensation to a nonlawyer third party may not be determined as a percentage or share of the lawyer's or law firm's overall revenues or tied to fees in particular

cases or legal matters. A lawyer may pay to a nonlawyer third party, such as a collection agency, a percentage of past due or delinquent fees in matters that have been concluded that the third party collects on the lawyer's behalf.

- [4] Other rules also protect the lawyer's independence of professional judgment. See, e.g., Rules 1.5.1, 1.8.6, and 5.1.
- [5] A lawyer's shares of stock in a professional law corporation may be held by the lawyer as a trustee of a revocable living trust for estate planning purposes during the lawyer's life, provided that the corporation does not permit any nonlawyer trustee to direct or control the activities of the professional law corporation.
- [6] The distribution of legal fees pursuant to a referral agreement between lawyers who are not associated in the same law firm is governed by Rule 1.5.1 and not this Rule.
- [7] A lawyer's participation in a lawyer referral service established, sponsored, supervised, and operated in conformity with the Minimum Standards for a Lawyer Referral Service in California is encouraged and is not, of itself, a violation of this Rule. See also Business and Professions Code section 6155.
- [8] Paragraph (a)(5) makes clear that a lawyer is permitted to pay court-awarded legal fees to non-profit legal aid, mutual benefit, and advocacy groups that are not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. See *Frye v. Tenderloin Housing Clinic, Inc.* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 23 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 221]. See also Rule 6.3. Regarding a lawyer's contribution of legal fees to a legal services organization, see Rule 6.1 Comment [4].

- [9] This Rule applies to group, prepaid, and voluntary legal service programs, activities and organizations and to non-profit legal aid, mutual benefit and advocacy groups. However, nothing in this Rule shall be deemed to authorize the practice of law by any such program, organization or group.
- [10] This Rule is not intended to abrogate case law regarding the relationship between insurers and lawyers providing legal services to insureds. See *Gafcon, Inc. v. Ponsor Associates* (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1388 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 392].

Rule 8.4 Misconduct

(Commission's Proposed Rule – Clean Version)

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

- (a) knowingly assist in, solicit, or induce any violation of these Rules or the State Bar Act;
- (b) commit a criminal act that involves moral turpitude or that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer;
- (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or intentional misrepresentation;
- (d) engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law, including when acting in propria persona, that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
- (e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate these Rules or other law; or
- (f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law.

COMMENT

Paragraph (a)

[1] A lawyer is subject to discipline for knowingly assisting or inducing another to violate these Rules or the State Bar Act, or to do so through the

acts of another, as when a lawyer requests or instructs an agent to do so on the lawyer's behalf.

Paragraph (b)

[2] A lawyer may be disciplined under paragraph (b) for a criminal act that reflects adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. However, some offenses carry no such implication. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category.

[2A] A lawyer may be disciplined for criminal acts as set forth in Article 6 of the State Bar Act, (Business and Professions Code sections 6101 et seq.), or if the criminal act constitutes "other misconduct warranting discipline" as defined by California Supreme Court case law. (See e.g., *In re Kelley* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 487 [276 Cal.Rptr. 375]; *In re Rohan* (1978) 21 Cal.3d 195, 203 [145 Cal.Rptr. 855] [wilful failure to file a federal income tax return]; *In re Morales* (1983) 35 Cal.3d 1 [196 Cal.Rptr. 353] [twenty-seven counts of failure to pay payroll taxes and unemployment insurance contributions as employer].)

[2B] In addition to being subject to discipline under paragraph (b), a lawyer may be disciplined under Business and Professions Code section 6106 for acts of moral turpitude that constitute gross negligence. (*Gassman v. State Bar* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 125 [132 Cal.Rptr. 675]; *Jackson v. State Bar* (1979) 23

Cal.3d 509 [153 Cal.Rptr. 24]; *In the Matter of Myrdall* (Rev. Dept. 1995) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 363 [habitual disregard of clients' interests]; *Grove v. State Bar* (1967) 66 Cal.2d 680 [58 Cal.Rptr. 564]. See also *Martin v. State Bar* (1978) 20 Cal.3d 717 [144 Cal.Rptr. 214]; *Selznick v. State Bar* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 704 [129 Cal.Rptr. 108]; *In the Matter of Varakin* (Rev. Dept. 1994) 3 Cal State Bar Rptr 179 [pattern of misconduct]; *In re Calloway* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 165 [141 Cal.Rptr. 805 [act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man or woman owes to fellow human beings or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between human beings]; *In re Craig* (1938) 12 Cal.2d 93 [82 P.2d 442].)

Paragraph (c)

[2C] Paragraph (c) does not apply where a lawyer advises clients or others about, or supervises, lawful covert activity in the investigation of violations of civil or criminal law or constitutional rights, provided the lawyer's conduct is otherwise in compliance with these Rules. But see Rule 1.2(d). "Covert activity," as used in this Rule, means an effort to obtain information on unlawful activity through the use of misrepresentations or other subterfuge. Covert activity may be commenced by a lawyer or involve a lawyer as an advisor or supervisor only when the lawyer in good faith believes there is a reasonable possibility that unlawful activity has taken place, is taking place, or will take place in the foreseeable future.

Paragraph (d)

[2D] Paragraph (d) is not intended to prohibit activities of a lawyer that are protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or by Article I, section 2 of the California Constitution. See, e.g., *Ramirez v. State Bar* (1980) 28 Cal 3d 402, 411 [169 Cal. Rptr 206] (a statement impugning

the honesty or integrity of a judge will not result in discipline unless it is shown that the statement is false and was made knowingly or with reckless disregard for truth); *In the Matter of Anderson* (Rev. Dept 1997) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 775 (disciplinary rules governing the legal profession cannot punish activity protected by the First Amendment); *Standing Committee on Discipline of the United States District Court for the Central District of California v. Yagman* (9th Cir. 1995) 55 F.3d 1430, 1443 (a lawyer's statement unrelated to a matter pending before the court may be sanctioned only if the statement poses a clear and present danger to the administration of justice).

[3] A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age or sexual orientation, violates paragraph (d) when such actions are prejudicial to the administration of justice. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not violate paragraph (d). A trial judge's finding that peremptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of paragraph (b).

[4] Testing the validity of any law, rule, or ruling of a tribunal is governed by Rule 1.2(d). Rule 1.2(d) is also intended to apply to challenges regarding the regulation of the practice of law.

[5] A lawyer's abuse of public office held by the lawyer or abuse of positions of private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager of a corporation or other organization, can involve conduct prohibited by this Rule.

[6] Alternative bases for professional discipline may be found in Article 6 of the State Bar Act, (Business and Professions Code sections 6100 et seq.), and published California decisions interpreting the relevant sections of the

State Bar Act. This Rule is not intended to provide a basis for duplicative charging of misconduct for a single illegal act.