

**STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA**  
**COMMISSION FOR THE REVISION OF THE RULES OF**  
**PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA**

**OPEN SESSION ACTION SUMMARY**

**Thursday, May 25, 2017**  
**(10:30 am – 2:30 pm)**

State Bar of California  
845 So. Figueroa Street  
Room 2C-E, 2nd Floor  
Los Angeles, CA 90017

**Members Present:** Lee Edmon (Chair), George Cardona, Danny Chou, Daniel Eaton, Tobi Inlender (Public Member), Kevin Mohr, Toby Rothschild, Mark Tuft (by teleconference).

**State Bar Staff Present:** Allen Blumenthal (Office of Chief Trial Counsel) (by teleconference), Randall Difuntorum (Office of Professional Competence), Gordon Grenier (State Bar Court), Elbert Lee (Office of Professional Competence), Mimi Lee (Office of Professional Competence), Carissa Andresen (Office of General Counsel) (by teleconference).

**Others Present:** James Blume, Katherine Bonaguidi (Innocence Project), Jose Castaneda, Seth Chazin (CACJ) (by teleconference), William Fabricus (CACJ) (by teleconference), Greg Fortescue (Supreme Court staff) (by teleconference), Jacqueline Goodman (CACJ); Nancy Hayden (CACJ), Ignazio Hernandez (CACJ) (by teleconference), Sharon Kramer (by telephone), Professor Laurie Levenson (Innocence Project), Jerry Miller, Michael Ogul (CPDA) (by teleconference), Chris Spaulding (CACJ) (by teleconference), and Mark Zahner (CDAA) (by teleconference).

**I. CHAIR'S REMARKS**

**A. Oral Report**

The Chair invited public comment from visitors attending the meeting in-person or by teleconference and the following persons addressed the Commission: Professor Laurie Levenson; Nancy Haydt; Katherine Bonaguidi; Jacqueline Goodman; James Blume; Jose Castaneda; William Fabricus; Chris Spaulding; Michael Ogul; Greg Fortescue; Sharon Kramer; Seth Chazin; and Ignazio Hernandez.

**II. ACTION**

**A. Reconsideration of Proposed Rule 5-110(D)**

The Chair led a discussion of the Rule 5-110(D) issues outlined in staff's May 16, 2017 memorandum to the Commission. Following discussion, the Commission considered a revised

version of Rule 5-110 that modified paragraph (D) and Discussion paragraph [3] as set forth below.

(D) Make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that the prosecutor knows\* or reasonably should know\* tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the offense, or mitigate the sentence, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal. ~~This obligation includes the duty to disclose information that casts significant doubt on the accuracy or admissibility of witness testimony or other evidence on which the prosecution intends to rely; and~~

\* \* \*

[3] The disclosure obligations in paragraph (D) ~~and~~ are not limited to evidence or information that is material as defined by *Brady v. Maryland* (1963) 373 U.S. 83 [83 S. Ct. 1194] and its progeny. ~~Nevertheless, rule 5-110 is not intended to~~ These obligations include, but are not limited to, the duty to disclose evidence or information that a prosecutor knows\* or reasonably should know\* casts significant doubt on the accuracy or admissibility of witness testimony or other evidence on which the prosecution intends to rely. Paragraph (D) does not require disclosure of ~~cumulative~~ information ~~or information that is~~ protected from disclosure by federal or California laws and rules, as interpreted by ~~cases~~ case law or court orders. Nothing in this rule is intended to be applied in a manner inconsistent with statutory and constitutional provisions governing discovery in California courts. A disclosure's timeliness will vary with the circumstances, and ~~rule 5-110~~ paragraph (D) is not intended to impose timing requirements different from those established by statutes, procedural rules, court orders, and case law interpreting those authorities and the California and federal constitutions.

Upon motion made, seconded and adopted, it was

**RESOLVED**, that the Commission hereby adopts proposed amended rule 5-110 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California in the form attached to this action summary and made a part hereto.

All members present voted yes.

The Chair recognized Mr. Difuntorum who elaborated on staff's suggested approach of issuing two alternate versions of Rule 5-110: one that is the version endorsed by the Commission; and a second version that presents the language attached to the Supreme Court's May 1, 2017 order. Following discussion, the Commission adopted a second version of proposed Rule 5-110 that uses the language attached to the Court's order with two changes: (1) the addition of "know or reasonably should know" to the second sentence of paragraph (D); and (2) deletion of the reference to "cumulative" in Discussion paragraph [3].

Upon motion made, seconded and adopted, it was

**RESOLVED**, that the Commission hereby adopts an alternate version of proposed amended rule 5-110 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California in the form attached to this action summary and made a part hereto.

All members present voted yes.

In submitting both versions to the Board Committee on Regulation and Discipline for public comment circulation, the Commission agreed that the two versions should be designated as "Alternative A" and "Alternative B" with the former being the language attached to the Supreme Court's order and the latter being the version recommended by the Commission. There was no objection to using this approach for designating the alternate versions.

**B. Reconsideration of Proposed Rule 5-110(E)**

The Chair called for discussion of the Rule 5-110(E) issues outlined in staff's May 17, 2017 memorandum to the Commission. The Chair recognized Mr. Cardona who explained why it might be helpful to table this discussion until the Commission's next meeting.

Upon motion made, seconded and adopted, it was

**RESOLVED**, that the Commission's consideration of Rule 5-110(E) is tabled until the Commission's next meeting.

All members present voted yes.

The Chair asked that Commission members provide feedback to staff on the issues raised by the Court on Rule 5-110(E) by the deadline of June 26, 2017. Email messages should be sent to staff (Mr. Difuntorum, Ms. Lee and Ms. McCurdy) and not sent to the other Commission members.

**CLOSED SESSION**

*None\**

\*Closed under Bus. & Prof. Code § 6026.5(a) to consult with counsel concerning pending or prospective litigation.

\*Closed under Bus. & Prof. Code Sec. 6026.5(d) to consider a personnel matter.



**Rule 5-110 Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor**  
**(Modified Version of the Revisions Included in the Supreme Court Order S239387**  
**Dated May 1, 2017 – Alternative A – Clean Version)**

The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:

- (A) Not institute or continue to prosecute a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause;
- (B) Make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;
- (C) Not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights unless the tribunal has approved the appearance of the accused in propria persona;
- (D) Make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that the prosecutor knows\* or reasonably should know\* tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the offense, or mitigate the sentence, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal. This obligation includes the duty to disclose information that a prosecutor knows\* or reasonably should know\* casts significant doubt on the accuracy or admissibility of witness testimony or other evidence on which the prosecution intends to rely; and
- (E) Exercise reasonable care to prevent persons under the supervision or direction of the prosecutor, including investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under rule 5-120.
- (F) When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted, the prosecutor shall:
  - (1) Promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or authority, and
  - (2) If the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor's jurisdiction,
    - (a) Promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court authorizes delay, and
    - (b) Undertake further investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause an investigation, to determine whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit.

- (G) When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a defendant in the prosecutor's jurisdiction was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction.

## Discussion

[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence, and that special precautions are taken to prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons. Rule 5-110 is intended to achieve those results. All lawyers in government service remain bound by rules 3-200 and 5-220.

[2] Paragraph (C) does not forbid the lawful questioning of an uncharged suspect who has knowingly waived the right to counsel and the right to remain silent. Paragraph (C) also does not forbid prosecutors from seeking from an unrepresented accused a reasonable waiver of time for initial appearance or preliminary hearing as a means of facilitating the accused's voluntary cooperation in an ongoing law enforcement investigation.

[3] The disclosure obligations in paragraph (D) and are not limited to evidence or information that is material as defined by *Brady v. Maryland* (1963) 373 U.S. 83 [83 S.Ct. 1194] and its progeny. Nevertheless, rule 5-110 is not intended to require disclosure of information that is protected from disclosure by federal or California laws and rules, as interpreted by cases law or court orders. Nothing in this rule is intended to be applied in a manner inconsistent with statutory and constitutional provisions governing discovery in California courts. A disclosure's timeliness will vary with the circumstances, and rule 5-110 is not intended to impose timing requirements different from those established by statutes, procedural rules, court orders, and case law interpreting those authorities and the California and federal constitutions.

[4] The exception in paragraph (D) recognizes that a prosecutor may seek an appropriate protective order from the tribunal if disclosure of information to the defense could result in substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest.

[5] Paragraph (E) supplements rule 5-120, which prohibits extrajudicial statements that have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. Paragraph (E) is not intended to restrict the statements which a prosecutor may make which comply with rule 5-120(B) or 5-120(C).

[6] Prosecutors have a duty to supervise the work of subordinate lawyers and nonlawyer employees or agents. (See rule 3-110, Discussion.) Ordinarily, the reasonable care standard of paragraph (E) will be satisfied if the prosecutor issues the appropriate cautions to law enforcement personnel and other relevant individuals.

[7] When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a person outside the prosecutor's jurisdiction was convicted of a crime that the person did not commit, paragraph (F) requires prompt disclosure to

the court or other appropriate authority, such as the chief prosecutor of the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred. If the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor's jurisdiction, paragraph (F) requires the prosecutor to examine the evidence and undertake further investigation to determine whether the defendant is in fact innocent or make reasonable efforts to cause another appropriate authority to undertake the necessary investigation, and to promptly disclose the evidence to the court and, absent court authorized delay, to the defendant. Disclosure to a represented defendant must be made through the defendant's counsel, and, in the case of an unrepresented defendant, would ordinarily be accompanied by a request to a court for the appointment of counsel to assist the defendant in taking such legal measures as may be appropriate. (See rule 2-100.)

[8] Under paragraph (G), once the prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor must seek to remedy the conviction. Depending upon the circumstances, steps to remedy the conviction could include disclosure of the evidence to the defendant, requesting that the court appoint counsel for an unrepresented indigent defendant and, where appropriate, notifying the court that the prosecutor has knowledge that the defendant did not commit the offense of which the defendant was convicted.

[9] A prosecutor's independent judgment, made in good faith, that the new evidence is not of such nature as to trigger the obligations of sections (F) and (G), though subsequently determined to have been erroneous, does not constitute a violation of rule 5-110.

**Rule 5-110 Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor  
(Commission's Proposed Rule Adopted on May 25, 2017 –  
Alternative B – Clean Version)**

The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:

- (A) Not institute or continue to prosecute a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause;
- (B) Make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;
- (C) Not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights unless the tribunal has approved the appearance of the accused in propria persona;
- (D) Make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that the prosecutor knows\* or reasonably should know\* tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the offense, or mitigate the sentence, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal; and
- (E) Exercise reasonable care to prevent persons under the supervision or direction of the prosecutor, including investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under rule 5-120.
- (F) When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted, the prosecutor shall:
  - (1) Promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or authority, and
  - (2) If the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor's jurisdiction,
    - (a) Promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court authorizes delay, and
    - (b) Undertake further investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause an investigation, to determine whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit.
- (G) When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a defendant in the prosecutor's jurisdiction was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction.

## Discussion

[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence, and that special precautions are taken to prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons. Rule 5-110 is intended to achieve those results. All lawyers in government service remain bound by rules 3-200 and 5-220.

[2] Paragraph (C) does not forbid the lawful questioning of an uncharged suspect who has knowingly waived the right to counsel and the right to remain silent. Paragraph (C) also does not forbid prosecutors from seeking from an unrepresented accused a reasonable waiver of time for initial appearance or preliminary hearing as a means of facilitating the accused's voluntary cooperation in an ongoing law enforcement investigation.

[3] The disclosure obligations in paragraph (D) are not limited to evidence or information that is material as defined by *Brady v. Maryland* (1963) 373 U.S. 83 [83 S. Ct. 1194] and its progeny. These obligations include, but are not limited to, the duty to disclose evidence or information that a prosecutor knows\* or reasonably should know\* casts significant doubt on the accuracy or admissibility of witness testimony or other evidence on which the prosecution intends to rely. Paragraph (D) does not require disclosure of information protected from disclosure by federal or California laws and rules, as interpreted by case law or court orders. Nothing in this rule is intended to be applied in a manner inconsistent with statutory and constitutional provisions governing discovery in California courts. A disclosure's timeliness will vary with the circumstances, and paragraph (D) is not intended to impose timing requirements different from those established by statutes, procedural rules, court orders, and case law interpreting those authorities and the California and federal constitutions.

[4] The exception in paragraph (D) recognizes that a prosecutor may seek an appropriate protective order from the tribunal if disclosure of information to the defense could result in substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest.

[5] Paragraph (E) supplements rule 5-120, which prohibits extrajudicial statements that have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. Paragraph (E) is not intended to restrict the statements which a prosecutor may make which comply with rule 5-120(B) or 5-120(C).

[6] Prosecutors have a duty to supervise the work of subordinate lawyers and nonlawyer employees or agents. (See rule 3-110, Discussion.) Ordinarily, the reasonable care standard of paragraph (E) will be satisfied if the prosecutor issues the appropriate cautions to law enforcement personnel and other relevant individuals.

[7] When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a person outside the prosecutor's jurisdiction was convicted of a crime that the person did not commit, paragraph (F) requires prompt disclosure to

the court or other appropriate authority, such as the chief prosecutor of the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred. If the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor's jurisdiction, paragraph (F) requires the prosecutor to examine the evidence and undertake further investigation to determine whether the defendant is in fact innocent or make reasonable efforts to cause another appropriate authority to undertake the necessary investigation, and to promptly disclose the evidence to the court and, absent court authorized delay, to the defendant. Disclosure to a represented defendant must be made through the defendant's counsel, and, in the case of an unrepresented defendant, would ordinarily be accompanied by a request to a court for the appointment of counsel to assist the defendant in taking such legal measures as may be appropriate. (See rule 2-100.)

[8] Under paragraph (G), once the prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor must seek to remedy the conviction. Depending upon the circumstances, steps to remedy the conviction could include disclosure of the evidence to the defendant, requesting that the court appoint counsel for an unrepresented indigent defendant and, where appropriate, notifying the court that the prosecutor has knowledge that the defendant did not commit the offense of which the defendant was convicted.

[9] A prosecutor's independent judgment, made in good faith, that the new evidence is not of such nature as to trigger the obligations of sections (F) and (G), though subsequently determined to have been erroneous, does not constitute a violation of rule 5-110.